Can you truly choose to believe something? Or is it always simply true that you believe?

One of the main arguments against *moral responsibility* is based on *determinism.* It seems that your choices are always the result of factors you can't control, and you can't choose what you choose. But *moral responsibility* isn't the only interesting form of responsibility. For instance, it's worth asking if you should be responsible for your beliefs, and if those beliefs should reflect your epistemic duties. But here again, the question is whether you can choose to believe or not believe. For instance, can you simply decide to choose to *not believe* in God? If *determinism* is true, then we should reject *doxastic voluntarism* in general. *Doxastic voluntarism* is the thesis that you can choose your beliefs. It's also called *epistemic voluntarism.* <br><br>Under *determinism*, it's not like you can choose to believe something, or choose to not believe something. However, you might believe in *compatibilism,* which seems to suggest that you can choose to believe something. That is, even if your choices are determined by factors that are not under your control, you can still choose to believe whatever you want. But it *seems* like that isn't true. You can't choose what you believe. Rather, you have beliefs of your own accord, and those beliefs are the result of a process that isn't under your control. So *doxastic voluntarism* is false. You can't choose to believe whatever you want, or what you think you should believe, or what people tell you to believe. That doesn't make sense.<br><br>&#x200B;<br><br>I'll give an example. Let's say you go to a church, and they tell you that God exists. But you're an *atheist* or *agnostic* or whatever. And you just outright reject it. You don't believe it. Even if you want to believe it, even if you think you should believe it, you just don't. Now, some Christians will say you can choose to believe, and that not choosing to believe is a sin or whatever. But it seems like that isn't true. It's not like you can choose to believe some claim, especially if it seems obviously false. If *determinism* is true, then it seems like we should accept *doxastic involuntarism* and reject *doxastic voluntarism.* When you believe something, it isn't because you choose to *not* believe it. It's just because you don't believe it. <br><br>&#x200B;<br><br>&#x200B;