The Meta Moral Inconsistencies

Here are my observations on the meta moral consistencies of certain belief systems, with special emphasis on the relationship between theism and atheism. Now, I will acknowledge that these are vast generalizations which will inevitably be false for certain individual cases. However, I think that these generalities are true, and I will try to provide a logical framework to justify their truth.<br><br>First, I'd like to introduce the concept of meta moralities. A meta morality is a set of criteria that are used to justify the truth of a certain moral system. For instance, theism posits that the truth of its moral system is justified by the will of God. Omnitarianism (the moral system that holds that all acts are moral) justifies the truth of its moral system by the fact that it allows for maximum happiness and freedom; on the individual level, omnitarianism holds that we should always be allowed to do what makes us the happiest, and that what makes us the happiest is being free to act as we wish. Meta moralities can be thought of as the rules used to justify moral rules. In other words, a meta morality cannot be reduced to a moral rule, but it is used to justify the truth of that moral rule. <br><br>The Meta Moral Consistency of the Christian God:<br><br>Christian Theism asserts that the moral rules are justified by God's will, and that these rules are themselves morally justifiable (by which I mean that the moral rules are justified according to God's will). In this case, we can see that there is a meta moral inconsistency. Namely, if the moral rules are justified because God wills it, then the meta moral rules used to justify those moral rules are also subject to change, because those meta moral rules were justified by God's will. In other words, if God wills something, it is considered moral. The reason we know that this is true is that the moral rules are justified by the will of God. Therefore, the meta moral rule that the moral rules are justified by God's will is itself justified by God's will; and therefore, if God decides to change that meta moral rule, then that is also considered moral. In other words, if God decides to change the meta moral rule that moral rules are justified by his will, that would also be considered moral.<br><br>So, here are a few problems with this:<br><br>First, how do we know that God has not changed this meta moral rule? We are told that God is eternally unchangeable, but this cannot be known, as we cannot know anything about God. Omnarianism posits that we should always have total freedom to act as we wish without interference. In this case, we can see that we do not have that freedom, as our actions are subject to the moral rules determined by God's will. <br><br>Second, if God does decide to change this meta moral rule, then we will never know, and we would still be subject to God's will. So, we have no way of knowing whether or not the meta moral rule that the moral rules are justified by God's will is true, and we can never know that, and so we can never know if an action is actually moral, because that morality may change at any moment. Furthermore, God may have changed that rule and we wouldn't know it. So, we have no way of knowing whether or not any action is actually moral.<br><br>The Meta Moral Consistency of Atheism (Omnitarianism)<br><br>Atheism posits that there is no God. In this case, we can justify the moral rules by the fact that they contribute to the greatest happiness for the greatest number (this is often posited by various flavors of utilitarianism). Omnitarianism posits that the moral rules justify total freedom to act as one wishes without interference. Now, in this case, we can see that there is a meta moral consistency. Namely, if the moral rules are justified because they contribute to the greatest happiness for the greatest number, then the meta moral rules used to justify those moral rules are also justified by their contribution to happiness. In other words, if the moral rules are justified by their contribution to happiness, then the meta moral rule that moral rules are justified by their contribution to happiness is also justified by its contribution to happiness. Thus, there is a meta moral consistency.<br><br>The Meta Moral Consistency of Moral Relativism<br><br>Moral Relativism asserts that there is no universal set of moral rules that applies to all people in all contexts. Rather, the truth of moral rules depends on the context in which they are uttered. In this case, we can see that there is a meta moral inconsistency. Namely, if the truth of moral rules depend on the context in which they are uttered, then the truth of the meta moral rules used to justify those contexts also depend on the context in which they are uttered. So, the question becomes; what is the context in which the meta moral rule that the truth of moral rules depend on their context is uttered? The only answer I can think of is that it is uttered in the context in which the truth of moral rules depend on their context. In other words, the meta moral rule that the truth of moral rules depend on the context in which they are uttered is uttered in the context in which the truth of moral rules depend on their context. This is obviously tautological and adds no new information. Moral relativism provides us with no way to justify the rules that determine the context in which moral rules are uttered. In other words, it provides us with no way to determine the context in which a moral utterance is made. <br><br>The point I'm trying to make here is that the truth of moral relativism cannot be known, as there is no way to determine the context in which it is uttered, and thus, there is no way to know whether or not it is true. Furthermore, if the meta moral rule that the truth of moral rules depend on their context is uttered in the context in which the truth of morphological rules depend on their context, then we would have to ask ourselves; what is the context in which that meta meta moral rule is uttered? Again, the only possible answer is that it is uttered in the context in which the truth of meta meta moral rules depend on their context. Again, this is obviously tautological, and provides no new information. <br><br>The Meta Moral Consistency of Skepticism<br><br>Skepticism asserts that all knowledge is impossible. In this case, we can see that there is a meta moral inconsistency. Namely, if all knowledge is impossible, then there is no way to know whether or not skepticism is true. If we claim that skepticism is true because we do not know anything, then that implies that we do know something, namely that we do not know anything. This is obviously tautological, and provides no new information. Therefore, skepticism cannot be known to be true; and therefore, it cannot be known whether or not any knowledge is possible.<br><br>In conclusion, the meta moral rules of theism, moral relativism, and skepticism are inconsistent, while omnitarianism has a consistent meta moral rule. I will acknowledge that some of these are vast generalizations that will not apply to every individual case, but I believe that they hold true in general.<br><br><br><br>EDIT: I have had a few comments saying that this is too long and convoluted. I will try to distill the main point:<br><br>Morality is justified by meta moral rules. Now, what justifies the truth of those meta moral rules? If those meta moral rules are justified by other meta meta moral rules, then those meta meta moral rules must be justified by other meta meta meta moral rules, and so on. Therefore, if we want to know if a certain meta moral rule is actually true, we must know the truth of the meta meta moral rule that justifies it, and we must know the truth of the meta meta meta moral rule that justifies that; and so on. I believe that this creates a problem, as it will inevitably lead to an infinite regress, and so, we will never actually know whether or not any meta moral rule is true. I think that theism, skepticism, and moral relativism inevitably lead to this infinite regress. I believe that omnitarianism does not. <br><br>&#x200B;